Among its total inventory, the Army is equipped with Javelin anti-armor missiles, 105mm light guns, and eight-wheel drive light armored vehicles each featuring a 25mm gun. Recently introduced equipment includes the 5.56mm MARS-L rifle and the Australian-made four-wheel drive Bushmaster infantry vehicle.

Like the country’s naval and air forces, the Army has suffered severe attrition in recent years, partly due to remuneration and the state of military housing. Nevertheless, the finance minister announced in January 2024 that government agencies must identify annual savings, including 7.5% from the Defence Ministry and 6.5% from the military, ahead of the budget, due May 30.

In February, the armed forces said that amid gaps in end strength, they were worried about the remaining staff who are “shouldering significant burden” to ensure major equipment and platforms remained at the ready.

Then on March 25, the chief of the defense force, Air Marshal Kevin Short, announced that Boswell will retire June 9.

During his 40 years of service, Boswell served with the United Nations in Angola, East Timor and the Middle East. Defense News recently connected with the Army chief to discuss the state of the force, ongoing modernization programs and the lingering effects of the pandemic. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What were your goals as Army chief?

On assuming command, I focused the Army’s effort very clearly toward becoming a modern, agile, highly adaptive, light combat force. Modernization involved giving momentum to the Network Enabled Army and Protected Mobility Capability programs as well as continuous improvement through the ongoing soldier modernization program.

Agility is the need for an army — even a small one — to provide the government with options across the spectrum of conflict while maintaining force structures able to task, organize, and — if required — reorganize as quickly as possible and as often as needed to meet changing requirements.

Our operating concept was to be framed by highly professional, highly capable special forces and light infantry, artillery and armor supported by agile, responsive combat support and combat service support.

How is the Network Enabled Army program coming along?

The program is a foundational requirement to achieving a networked, combat-capable force able to operate in a multidomain, multinational combat environment. It will provide the Army with a range of capabilities with which it can collect, transmit, manage and disseminate data in the contemporary operating environment.

Significant progress has been made in this space as we identify and introduce into service the equipment and systems that will enable our Army to better meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment.

What are the easiest and most challenging aspects of your job?

The smoothest was, without question, having the support of incredibly competent commanders and staff at all levels across the Army. We really are fortunate with the caliber of people within the Army, and having the opportunity to lead them was both humbling and an honor.

With respect to the most challenging aspect of my time as the chief of the Army: the COVID-19 period, and the Army’s decisive commitment to our nation’s COVID-19 response, which was significant. [The pandemic had] wide-ranging impacts on the Army — mostly negative.

Challenges with retention, the generation and maintenance of individual and collective capabilities, and the effective introduction into service of new equipment, vehicles and infrastructure have all been impacted. A lot of work took place in the last 12 or so months to give energy, purpose and direction to the Army’s post-COVID-19 regeneration, but we still have some ways to go.

Without question, the toughest thing to deal with has been how environmental factors have, in a relatively short space of time, impacted the number of experienced professionals within the Army. For the vast majority of our command and specialist appointments, we can’t recruit directly and have to attract, train and retain these people.

In the last three years our Army has lost some absolute treasure due to disillusionment with our role during COVID-19, a lack of operational deployments, and external employment opportunities offering more variety and significantly better remuneration.

Commanders at all levels, both within Army and across the New Zealand Defence Force, have worked hard to shift the dial in this space. We are now seeing the results of that effort. It is, however, a circumstance we won’t quickly recover from and are going to have to remain focused on.

How is the hiatus on training and operations that took place during the pandemic still affecting the force?

We are still able to provide the government with immediate response options across the spectrum of conflict, should it choose to commit the Army to an operational theater. Sustaining those commitments for an extended period is problematic because of the gaps we currently have, post-COVID-19, in key specialist, trade and command appointments.

What is foremost on your wish list for the Army, in terms of personnel and equipment?

With respect to personnel, the chief people officer, with support from across the New Zealand Defence Force, including the Army, is leading a range of initiatives reviewing remuneration, conditions of service and allowances. Landing this effort and then resourcing it accordingly will not be easy, but it has to happen, and it has to happen quickly.

From an equipment perspective, giving real momentum to the Network Enabled Army, Protected Mobility Capability and soldier modernization programs will both enable aging capabilities to be replaced and ensure the force is equipped to operate effectively in the contemporary environment.

How does the Army contribute to the defense of its Western allies?

The New Zealand Defence Force is a combat-capable military force, trained, equipped and ready to respond every hour of the day, every day of the year. We contribute to international peace and security and the rules-based order through deployments of importance to New Zealand.

The New Zealand Army has a bilateral service cooperation plan, dubbed Plan Anzac, with the Australian Army. How has that impacted your force?

Plan Anzac reflects a broader defense relationship, one that is open, based on mutual respect and is enduring. It reflects the value of land power to both nations, and the value that interoperability between the Australian and New Zealand armies brings to combined joint operations.

The agreement makes sure both armies can work as efficiently as possible, complementing each other’s capabilities and capacity. It provides a focus and framework to take ongoing conversations and engagements between allies and mates, and then formalize these to improve existing cooperation.

We are able to better share lessons across capability development, doctrine for training, and many other areas related to the generation and — in the New Zealand Army’s current case — the regeneration of land combat capability.

Is the New Zealand Army’s culture at risk amid Australian input, or vice versa?

We have much more in common than we have differences, but we will always be who we are as Kiwis. And our Aussie mates will always be who they are. Ultimately we are a pretty potent mix and always the better off when we come together in pursuit of a common cause.

How will the military recover from attrition and a lack of experience before the next conflict breaks out?

The New Zealand Defence Force recognizes it will take some years to fully recover the workforce due to the time needed to train suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Despite this, the program to retain, recruit and reenlist people is showing dividends, with the regular force’s attrition reducing from over 15% this time last year to 10.3% as of Feb. 29, 2024.

Over the past year or more, specific targeted payments to critical trades, and a general forcewide retention payment, have been made as part of a range of initiatives to address attrition rates. These payments have been largely funded from unspent personnel expenditure. When facing workforce challenges, steps need to be taken to address them, so prioritization has been given to critical areas of need across the New Zealand Defence Force.

Are the public and politicians adequately aware of national security threats?

New Zealand is becoming more aware of the geostrategic challenges that we face as a nation. Without question, various agencies of government have a key role to play in monitoring and advising security threats. But equally it is important to recognize the role that other institutions play, such as academia and the media.

Is the military making the best use of domestic industry and academia?

Like anything we do, there is always room for improvement. The New Zealand Defence Force’s relationship with both industry and academia is no different and will only keep going from strength to strength, given the mutual respect and positive engagement that occurs between all parties.

How does climate change affect the balance between training for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and practicing for combat?

The primary focus of the Army’s training is and always will remain combat. Forces led, trained and equipped for combat can rapidly adjust to the requirements of support operations when the need arises.

Who are your heroes?

My family. They have sacrificed so much to allow me to serve for as long as I have and in the way that I have. I owe them a debt of thanks that I’m not sure I can ever repay.

Defense News on Feb. 9 talked to Parker about how the Army is working to integrate its modern capabilities on the battlefield to provide a layered approach to addressing a widening array of complex threats, as seen in Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion and in the Middle East.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Some programs among various cross-functional teams are transitioning to other portfolios, particularly Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, in your case. How is that coming along for major programs like the Integrated Battle Command System and Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense?

We would like everything to be able to transition into a program of record. You’ve hit on two of our signature modernization efforts. As we look at M-SHORAD Increment 1 — our kinetic version — we are currently fielding our third battalion for that at Fort Cavazos, Texas, with our first battalion in Germany and the second battalion at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

PEO Missiles and Space is heavily involved with that. When we look at M-SHORAD Inc 1, that initially came out as part of a directed requirement.

We are moving through the requirements process, we briefed the Protection Functional Capabilities Board in December, and we got the [Joint Capabilities Board] scheduled for April for an Inc 1 capabilities development document.

We continue to codify those requirements, specifically for sustainment of the capability. That’s going to put us in a good place to get this thing fully transitioned and get that capability to the warfighter.

IBCS is our other big signature effort. It is a program of record. A full-rate production decision has been made. PEO Missiles and Space is working on that.

[We are looking at] software upgrades to the system to be able to incorporate additional capability. We’ve established a governance process where we [consider] additional capabilities to incorporate within the system, and we’re able to prioritize that from not only a material developer but from a capability developer standpoint with the proponent at Fort Sill.

We want to transition all of our programs over to the two Army capability managers.

We’re still on track for fielding to the first unit in fiscal 2025.

The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation recently released a report with a section on integrated air and missile defense. A full operational test and evaluation for IBCS was scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of FY24. Is that on track? As the report mentioned, that FOT&E will evaluate how well deficiencies were corrected.

There were some challenges noted in the initial operational test and evaluation, and that’s part of our prioritization process we look at about every month.

We are currently working through that to make sure they are addressed and we have those fixed for FOT&E. That is on schedule.

That’s part of the bigger complex problem PEO Missiles and Space has — three signature modernization efforts all inherently linked together between IBCS, the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor, and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability, all being fielded on a very similar timeline — and making sure all those efforts are integrated. It is not an [enviable] task. That’s why they essentially came up with the integrated fires test campaign we’re now on, leading up to that FOT&E for IBCS.

It’s about working those development efforts simultaneously. PEO Missiles and Space is doing a great job making sure these development efforts are synchronized because one slip and we could be looking at a domino effect. That’s why the second and third order effects to other programs are part of that conversation.

The integrated fires test campaign is designed to support milestone decisions we have coming up for each of the programs. Everything is currently on track. That’s the good-news story, but your “spidey senses” are always looking for where that hiccup could happen that then creates a domino effect across three programs.

The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor is in testing now. You’ve received radars. The front end and the back end will come together later. How are things going?

There’s been no change to the plan. This program has had challenges, but the thing that’s really reinforced my confidence as of late was the flight testing that happened this past quarter — two successful engagements on the front end against surrogate threat targets.

Now we are looking toward integrating that back-end piece as well so that we actually have the full 360-degree capability. It’s still in development, but some of the initial feedback was positive.

The Indirect Fire Protection Capability is another program that has taken longer than expected. Please provide an update on the Army’s receipt of the first IFPC launchers. There was also a request for information that came out for a second interceptor.

[IFPC is an] important piece of the puzzle. This is definitely a concept we’ve had coming for a while. The good news is we have launchers now out on the ranges.

The PEO Missiles and Space team recently had a successful launch of an AIM-9 missile off one of our launchers. I’m looking down the road toward that continual developmental testing we have coming up, all leading toward test flights and IOT&E, [expected] in 2026.

We’re going to have a cruise missile-capable interceptor with the AIM-9X. [The second interceptor] is about more advanced capabilities.

[The PEO Missiles and Space program executive officer], Brig. Gen. Frank Lozano, and his team are working diligently as they get their request for information responses back.

You are designing a multimission launcher for IFPC. How is the Army looking at a wider variety of interceptors beyond one or two types? What is realistic to have in the family of interceptors that could be part of IFPC?

I have had a lot of conversations about interceptors lately. A specific lesson we’re taking out of Ukraine is there’s no silver bullet. What is working for Ukraine is a layered system-of-systems approach.

I’m kind of frequency hopping over [the topic of] counter-unmanned aerial system [technology]. How do we get ahead of the cost curve? Some of these small UASs are developed for a few [hundred dollars] or a few [thousand]. The commander on the ground will fire [at] that to save lives or protect an asset, but I’d rather not have to force them into that corner.

We’re taking a look at some low-cost solutions. We’re taking a look at how we can increase magazine depth. We’re taking a look at capabilities such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon, the less expensive Hydra rocket variants that potentially get after that cost curve but still provide a level of lethality we would need to combat two or three small UAS threats.

The same can apply for IFPC; the counter-cruise missile fight; the Patriot air defense system for [the Lower Tier Future Interceptor] in bridging some littoral space; and the Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems.

The counter-small UAS mission is relatively new for the AMD CFT. How is that taking shape? How are you supporting the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office as well as the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office?

You kind of hit the nail on the head in terms of it taking a village, especially with this mission set. Case in point: I just met with the Air Force Research Laboratory on what it’s developing.

In April 2022, there were four signature modernization efforts [for AMD CFT]. A couple months later, we had five. So as we talk about evolving, that’s one of the things we’re continuing to transform on.

We are currently in the process of fielding our first two division sets. It’s the first phase of that first division set fielding —primarily the handheld capabilities we’re procuring.

That will be followed, before the end of the year, with essentially phase two, which is focused more on the Low, slow, small, unmanned aircraft Integrated Defeat System, the Ku-band Radio Frequency Sensor radars, [and] the Coyote variants. Those capabilities [will go] to the first two divisions.

What observations from warfare in Ukraine and the Middle East are influencing what your team does?

Some of the stuff is potentially in the realm of machine learning and being able to help system operators make decisions.

We are continuing to look at how the threat is evolving with respect to speed, with respect to hardening defense mechanisms that platforms have in terms of payload, capacity, battery life — all these things that can enhance their capability.

The Army wants to replace the Stinger missile. Where does that effort stand?

That’s Inc 3 of M-SHORAD. Inc 1 is the kinetic version we’re currently fielding; Inc 2 is our directed-energy version we’re working on with the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office.

Inc 3 is two things primarily: one is the next-generation Stinger, two is the 30mm proximity fuse ammunition.

Both are helping us gain capability within that M-SHORAD [space] and over to the counter-UAS space. With the next-generation Stinger, we are looking at increasing or getting better capability than we had with our previous generation.

There are two main competitors for the [Stinger replacement] competition PEO Missiles and Space is handling.

What else is getting your attention beyond specific portfolio items?

One of the things we’re starting to look toward is a human-machine interface. We’re going to [carry out] some engagements and try to learn as much as we can.

I’m not trying to look at it from a platform perspective, but a system perspective in terms of what we can leverage that’s already been done, and how can we adjust that in order to be able to focus on an air defense-type system on top of it.

The government appointed Judith Collins to the role in October. She’s also the attorney general; the minister for the Government Communications Security Bureau; the minister in charge of digitizing the government; the minister of the Security Intelligence Service; the minister of science, innovation and technology; and the minister of space.

The New Zealand Defence Force’s briefing to the new minister noted the country faces a “challenging strategic environment” not seen for decades, adding that climate change is “of increasing concern.”

While the briefing explained the military is energized by newly acquired equipment, it also cautioned personnel could feel overwhelmed, given they are charged with maintaining the existing inventory while adopting more materiel.

Furthermore, the force has been experiencing retention and recruitment issues. While deployments are “a key motivator for our people,” the diminishing number of qualified and experienced people called upon to deploy is problematic, the briefing noted. “Although recruitment of new personnel continues, unlike civilian staff, uniformed personnel cannot be recruited from the general labor market, as their skills take years to acquire and that training occurs inside the force.”

Defense News put these concerns and more to the minister in a Feb. 8 interview, which was edited for length and clarity.

The previous government released a defense policy and strategy document in August 2023. What do you think of it?

The defense strategy released last year reflected the changing strategic environment and the need to update New Zealand’s policy settings to a more proactive and deliberate approach to security and defense. That geopolitical tension has, if anything, increased since its release.

When will the next defense whitepaper arrive?

Work is underway on a Defence Capability Plan, which will signal the government’s future investment intentions for defense.

What are your priorities for defense and the three armed services?

Retention, interoperability, innovation and international partnerships are my priorities for defense. This includes giving our personnel more opportunities to do what they signed up for and looking at how we can do things differently.

We must take every opportunity to engage with our international partners so we can further our national interests and ensure the New Zealand perspective is heard. We must also listen so we can contribute meaningfully, and be open to new opportunities where they align with our interests.

To what do you attribute the shortage of recruits and the high attrition in the New Zealand Defence Force?

There are several drivers behind the high attrition rates at NZDF, including remuneration, a strong labor market and highly skilled defense personnel being in demand. The NZDF is working on a number of initiatives to address attrition issues. As of late December 2023, the overall regular force’s attrition rate — across all three services — was 11.9%, down from 15.6% 10 months earlier.

In mid-2023, Air Marshal Kevin Short, the chief of the NZDF, told Defense News that the war in Ukraine has emphasized the importance of the military’s supply chain. He said the force would “look at its ‘just in time’ approach, and adjust to a ‘just in case’ approach.” With the demand for ammunition soaring, has New Zealand had to wait longer than usual for ammo, particularly as the country modifies its acquisition approach?

The NZDF is experiencing longer ammunition and explosive procurement lead times than historically normal, but it is wrong to say it has moved from “just in time” to “just in case” ordering. The NZDF orders ammunition to meet stockholdings that support training and force generation, as well as to maintain stockholdings necessary to meet contingencies.

New Zealand is a nation of islands, yet the Navy is the least funded and staffed of the services. Why is that? Will this change?

The NZDF is funded and equipped based on the priorities of the government of the day and continues to serve at the direction of the government of the day, with the equipment and staffing it has available.

Work on future opportunities for the maritime fleet began last year, with market research being undertaken and 49 responses received. The next stage will be advice to the government on next steps for future investment intentions for defense, and I look forward to sharing more details at that stage.

The second pillar of AUKUS — the defense cooperation agreement between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. — could benefit New Zealand’s defense industry and military. Talk about that potential opportunity.

We are actively looking for ways in which New Zealand can participate in AUKUS’ second pillar, as discussed at the Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations 2+2 meeting in early February between the foreign affairs and defense ministers of both New Zealand and Australia.

Australian officials will visit New Zealand as soon as possible to discuss opportunities for New Zealand to join, and in what areas we can add value. I expect it will be in technology and space, which are both areas that offer opportunities to New Zealand businesses and scientists. We expect to take a formal decision on participation at some point this year as details emerge.

We do expect that the second pillar could create potential openings for collaboration with the New Zealand’s defense industry and adjacent technology companies. Collaboration between Australia’s and New Zealand’s defense industries is something we actively encourage, and we are always looking for ways to reduce barriers.

Will New Zealand establish a space command?

There are no current plans for a space command under New Zealand’s joint forces. The development of a Defence Capability Plan currently underway will consider investment options, including options for space, against the government’s priorities, policy settings and financial considerations.

What more might New Zealand do to support Ukraine as it fights off a Russian invasion?

New Zealand continues to stand with Ukraine in complete solidarity for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. New Zealand’s support to Ukraine’s self-defense since Russia’s invasion has included economic, diplomatic and military elements. As part of this ongoing support, NZDF deployments that provide support and training to Ukraine are continuing.

Several European military leaders have warned their citizens about a potential war with Russia. Do you envisage issuing a similar alert?

Comments made domestically by other countries are a matter for them, and I do not have a comment to make on these.

The office is the service’s hub for commercial engagement, partnering with several other programs and initiatives, including SpaceWERX — the Space Force’s innovation arm — and Space Systems Command’s Front Door, an online portal companies can use to connect with the acquisition community. It’s also leading the establishment of a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, an effort to scale up its use of commercial capabilities during a conflict.

The Commercial Space Office’s creation came amid a push within the Space Force to strengthen its partnership with commercial industry. Officials have called for the acquisition workforce to consider opportunities to buy services and systems from industry — rather than build a bespoke government satellite — wherever possible.

Col. Richard Kniseley, who leads the office, recently sat down with C4ISRNET at the Space Mobility Conference in Orlando, Florida. He talked about the office’s accomplishments over the last year and its priorities for 2024.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What has your office done since its creation last year?

We marched forward with the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, and stood up that task force with many Department of Defense subject matter experts to really flesh out that framework. That all culminated in a successful briefing to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall around September where he said: “Go forth and prosper.” He considered this good news and a step in the right direction, especially as we’re looking at great power competition.

The SSC Front Door has been meeting with many different industry members every day. This past August, we onboarded a new website and share tool. Since then, we’ve met with over 200 industry members. The goal of that website was to have faster response time, to make sure that we were assessing industry, understanding their maturity levels, and then understanding the mission areas they can play in so that we can get them to the right mission area owner.

Our alignment with SpaceWERX has proved very successful. We aligned a SpaceWERX challenge with one of our first reverse industry days out of the gate, which was alternative positioning, navigation and timing. The goal of that was to seed industry, but also to keep a lot of the conversations going and mature capabilities.

We also awarded, out of the Commercial Satellite Communications Office, the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contract, which was a $900 million [indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract]. It went out to 20 different vendors and covered many different mission areas. We didn’t want to hone in just on commercial SATCOM, so we opened it up to alternative position, navigation and timing, as well as space domain awareness, to name a few. The goal out of that was to capitalize on dual-use capabilities.

So we are not slowing down in 2024; it is going to be a very busy year, and we’ve already got a number of different things on the horizon.

How do you expect the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contractor pool to grow? What value will that bring to the Space Force?

While it was awarded to 20 providers, we are onboarding new providers. In fact, we have an onboarding period right now, which ends in May, where new providers can reach out to the Commercial SATCOM Office and be evaluated as a provider on that contract.

It allows the contractors to propose areas where they can benefit the Department of Defense. It’s a very open contract, and it allows us to work and reach out with a lot of those providers. But that contract also allows us to combine a lot of different requirements across the Department of Defense into one award, so that we’re not doing one award, one award, one award. The first task order that got awarded to SpaceX combined requirements from over 70 different agencies.

So it’s the ability to get better pricing and economic order quantity by combining a lot of those requirements. It allows us to get more providers on, understand their capabilities, and get those commercial capabilities out to the warfighter and better integrated across the space enterprise.

The Space Mobility Conference saw a heavy focus on space servicing. What is your office doing in this area? How are you engaging with the companies developing these capabilities?

A great deal of the companies that have been coming through the Front Door that we have been meeting with have been companies aligning themselves with servicing, mobility and logistics. So whether we have companies that are looking at the refueling aspect of it, companies that are looking at the repair aspect of it or even the maneuverability aspect of it — there is a great deal of innovation and expertise in those different areas.

What we’ve been doing is assessing these companies for their maturity level, but also one of the functions of the Front Door is to take a look at the investments in those companies — venture capital and also any potential nefarious capital. We do want to be investing in companies that are on the up and up. But at the same time, we’re also looking at companies where the government can be one of many customers and not just be a crutch to lean on.

We’ve been bridging that gap between the companies and the mission areas. We’ve been introducing a lot of great companies to the Assured Access to Space team — so looking for investment opportunities there as well as working with the Space Systems Integration Office. They are looking at the overall enterprise and where does servicing, mobility and logistics fit into that overall architecture.

You can only imagine what those capabilities will do for the mission because you will be able to refuel some of our [high-value] space vehicles, which allows them to stay on orbit longer and do more mission passes.

Some of the technologies that are coming into play have a lot more size, weight and power so that while they can be carrying space vehicles to many different orbits, these things can also carry gas cans on them. They have more abilities to stay on orbit longer. You can even deploy them, and you don’t even need to use the space vehicles right away; they could just sit there in a loiter state, which kind of lends itself a little bit more to the logistics side of the house. You could save the gas on those space vehicles and have them ready, which also lends itself more to a tactically responsive space standpoint.

What are the most important parts of the Space Force’s upcoming commercial space strategy?

It’s going to do two things. One, it’s going to be a very clear message to the government that because of the threats, we need to change how we do things. Resting on building everything in house is just not palatable anymore. We need to integrate with commercial [sectors] at better scale. It recognizes how the commercial industry is innovating every single day. A lot of the expertise is out there.

What the strategy is also going to do is be a signal to industry of areas of importance to us. We’re not going to prioritize areas, but it will be very clear some of the areas that are very important to the government. Throughout the strategy, there will be kind of a mixture of strategy, but also some implementation. So there’ll be some actions that will be in that strategy, and then it will also be further fleshed out with implementation plans that will be released after the strategy is released.

The Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, or CASR, framework received approval last fall. How is your office implementing that?

My No. 1 focus is working with [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the National Space Council on a threat-sharing model. The Department of Defense has a few of them that we are exploring.

We are working to develop a surveillance plan for CASR membership. That’s really going to lend itself into the reliability construct, ensuring they stay in good standing as a member. Are they still investing in their cyber capabilities? Are they able to surge or adhere to the contract as planned? And even looking at some of their manufacturing capabilities. Once we get you to that membership, we need to make sure you’re ready for what that potential bad day might be.

We’re also integrating right now with tactically responsive space [team]. We want to inject CASR fundamentals and exercises into one of their next capability exercises. I could easily see a scenario of a surging of capability, or even potentially taking space vehicles off a production line for a CASR need. That’s really going to help us exercise the contract and the concept of operations.

We are starting to develop the concept of operations, partnered with U.S. Space Command, primarily looking at commercial satellite communications as the first one. Putting that to paper is going to help us work toward exercises as well. But then after that, it’s really working on securing funding.

When will you start putting companies on contract for CASR?

We’re going to start fleshing out the contract pieces a little bit more this year.

I promised this to industry: We will still have a couple more industry offerings so that I can be completely transparent with them before they start seeing this in contracts. I almost want to get a litmus test from them and make sure that I’m going down the right path, especially as we’re starting to develop our incentive plan.

I’m going to potentially have something this year, but probably 2025.

You previously said it’s important to have a sustained budget line, or program element, for commercial space capabilities, including CASR. Where does that effort stand?

I’m anxiously waiting on the appropriations bill. If all goes well, the appropriations bill could be the mechanism that starts the commercial space program element. There was some language in the Senate Appropriations Committee markup that pretty much allows for the creation of it, and I just want to see if that language makes its way through. Those dollars were specifically targeted at commercial surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking, so that would be a budget activity created under the commercial space piece. We’re waiting to see the outcome of that one.

What other efforts would receive funding under that new budget line?

We’re definitely looking at the funding of some enterprise capabilities, like funding for exercises, funding for threat sharing — all of that.

There will need to be an enduring CASR line in there to keep that overall enterprise together. Some of the biggest feedback we got from industry was that we need to understand what’s going on with the threat. And I totally resonated with that because that’s going to help them be more responsive to our needs. It’s going to help inform their business area. If they’re a CASR member, then that’ll help them indicate when a call-up might be OK.

Brig. Gen. Mike Zuhlsdorf is a key player in those discussions. He serves as the deputy director for resource integration under the Air Force’s logistics, engineering and force protection branch.

As other defense officials negotiate with foreign leaders for access to bare-bones airfields and more established bases overseas, it’s Zuhlsdorf’s team that is figuring out how to turn those sites into valuable Air Force lily pads in a maritime-dominant region for the decades ahead.

Zuhlsdorf spoke to Air Force Times at the Pentagon on Dec. 15. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Is the Air Force talking to other countries about using foreign bases that already exist, or are you considering building new sites?

We are not putting in new bases. These are bases and airfields that we’ve had since World War II, where we were able to hopscotch across the Pacific to ultimately get close enough to Japan. There are a lot of airfields like that, whether it’s in the first island chain — Japan down through the Philippines — or the second island chain, near Guam and Tinian.

We’re talking about renovating, rejuvenating and rehabilitating. We will make sure the pavement is still viable, trim back the vegetation where the jungle has encroached on the runway, and set up the basic essentials that we need in the event that we need to flush aircraft from a hub into these spokes, keep them safe and then turn them.

What do we need? Things like fuel; major aircraft parts that six to 12 airmen might be able to fix there; maybe some munitions [and airfield repair resources]; the essential lighting or navigational systems for nighttime operations. A little bit of base air defense might be part of that, or camouflage, concealment and deception. Almost all the hubs will have a command, control and communication system that will fly in with them so that we can maintain connectivity to the mothership at all times.

We are working with allies and partners. Pacific Air Forces has identified airfields that we want to invest in, and they’re going to work with the Philippines and Australia to do that. We are teaming with them on some projects that will allow us to get fuel out there, some munitions capability and other long-range transport aircraft that would come in and be able to resupply.

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Which existing airfields are currently on the list?

There are more in the second island chain that we are identifying. There are additional airfields that are in Guam and a few in the first island chain that we’ll eventually get to.

What we’re trying to do is nail down access and overflight stuff before a formal announcement would come out. Those that have been in the press are the ones where we’ve already teamed with those countries. We are working with other allies and partners in the area to secure that very critical access, overflight and basing.

[Editor’s note: A spokesperson for the Air Force’s international affairs branch declined to provide specifics about which countries the U.S. is in talks with to host air operations abroad.]

Will the Air Force expand Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or other areas on the island?

We have projects for some hangars that are going in at Andersen, and at some of the chosen hubs we want to operate out of, maybe a spoke or two — wherever we decide is optimal. We’re looking to maybe throw up a shelter system that allows us to safeguard critical equipment. We need to take into account the sustainment of all that equipment we pre-position, and so we will want to put those into a controlled-environment facility so that when we need it, it’ll operate as advertised.

We’re also thinking about protecting those hubs and spokes so that the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines and guardians that we’re going to send out there will be as safe as possible. There’s a big threat from ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. We’re trying to make sure those airmen can turn those aircraft as advertised.

None of us who wear this uniform are looking for war. Our job is to be prudent with taxpayer dollars, and what the American people want from us is to plan.

What’s the timeline to open these sites? How are you phasing them in?

Two to three future years defense programs (FYDP). We are working through [which sites should be prioritized].

Is 10-15 years too long?

We’re going to see concrete stuff within a [five-year] FYDP and it will continue to manifest through that time period. We’ve got some weapon systems in the queue — Next Generation Air Dominance, collaborative combat aircraft. It’ll happen in that window.

What are you learning from Air Force spokes across Europe that you’ve used in partner countries since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? How are you applying those lessons to the Pacific?

This is a unique opportunity for us. We’ve been in U.S. Central Command, and being able to move pieces, parts, munitions, aircraft, personnel and everything like that has been relatively uncontested. Yes, the Army has had some challenges there when you talk about the main supply routes, but generally it was not a contested environment. Ukraine is a contested environment, and logistics lessons that we learn are invaluable.

What are the critical pieces and parts that they need? How did they get these parts from location X to location Y? Did they use this system or that system? How did they pull the data? We are rapidly getting to a data analytics framework that’s going to allow us to visibly see what supplies and equipment we need. We’re going to be able to throw that up into a basing and logistics data analytics environment that’s going to allow us to, as logisticians, figure out where we need to put the next aircraft part or the next load of fuel.

Russia and Ukraine have a lot of small unmanned aerial systems that are impeding each other’s progress. How are they tracking those systems? How are they taking those systems down? How are they doing air defense for air bases? Those lessons are being gathered up.

What is the proposed cost for Pacific basing projects in fiscal 2025?

We’re working through FY25. That’s part of the resourcing our senior leaders are churning through right now.

There hasn’t been a profound change in counter-drone technology over the past several years. Where does that capability stand and what would you like to see?

We are probably still nascent. We literally just had conversations about this — within the last four or five months — about expanding and investing more in that very important battlespace. There’s a lot of research and a lot of dollars that are being applied to that problem set. You see that coming into play not only in the Ukrainian-Russian war, but also now with Hamas and Israel.

Are small drones a threat in the Pacific, despite the region’s significant size?

These are all islands, and they all have an indigenous population. You can rest assured that there’s probably people who don’t like the United States on those islands. Some of these smaller systems could absolutely impact an air tasking order. To protect the integrity of that air tasking order, we need to think through how we can get at that small threat, while other people are thinking through those ballistic missiles and those hypersonic missiles.

It is a full-spectrum air defense platform for an air base that we’re looking at, along with the camouflage, concealment and deception program, electronic warfare, and all these bits and pieces.

What are the main hurdles to achieving this vision?

One of the big problems is not having a budget. When you think about procurement lines that we need to stand up and invest in, we absolutely need Congress’ help in getting a budget passed so we can get the capabilities that we know we need.

There’s always the joint interoperability piece that we are yearning for, and the ability to share information with our allies and partners. We’re trying to work a little bit more aggressively on what information we can share with them, and what tactics, techniques and procedures we might be able to share. We’ve had success in Australia recently on some refueling efforts with the F-35 fighter jet. That’s a big success.

We’re breaking down barriers where we can to make sure that we’ve got the necessary capability and that everybody understands what that is. We’re sending people over to Japan right now to work with them even closer on exercises and on different weapons systems. Those are big barriers, but we’re overcoming them.

The threat that’s been posed to us over the last three or four years from the People’s Republic of China has galvanized a lot of allies and partners of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. There’s an impetus for us to work even closer together moving forward.

What near-term spending is on the horizon?

We’re investing in pre-positioned assets. That includes the kits with the tools and equipment that are necessary to do the maintenance on those aircraft. We’re investing in fuel bladders, in the renovation of the airfields, and in the airfield damage and repair equipment.

Think about heavy equipment — mobile aircraft arresting systems. Some of that stuff we have not put on a production line in a long time. We are investing in production lines to get that built and put in place within this Future Years Defense Program. We’re investing in communication equipment that will allow us to do command and control.

We’re investing in our airmen with multi-capable airman training. The Air Force Expeditionary Center at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, is putting together the curriculum that’s necessary for us to train our airmen and get them ready to have a civil engineer do not just civil engineering work, but maybe change a tire or load a bomb or refuel a jet or protect the base. It’s about investing in all those things that are necessary for us to get at a threat that, frankly, we just haven’t had to think about as much in the last 30 years.

When I came in, it was the Soviet Union, it was protecting the Fulda Gap in Germany. We learned a lot of skills that were multi-capable back in the late 1980s that we are now dusting off. We’re going to apply that to this near-peer fight.